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Abstract
Ambiguity attitudes have been indicated as important determinants of economic
outcomes in economic models, but we still know little about the demographic cor-
relates of ambiguity attitudes, or indeed about the universality of patterns found
in the West. We analyse the ambiguity attitudes of almost 3000 students across 30
countries. For gains we find ambiguity aversion everywhere, while ambiguity aver-
sion is much weaker for losses. We also find ambiguity attitudes to systematically
change with probabilities for both gains and losses, reflecting ambiguity-insensitivity
to probabilities. Much of the between-country variation can be explained through a
few macroeconomic characteristics. In contrast, we find massive unexplained vari-
ation at the individual level, suggesting that individual diﬀerences in ambiguity
attitudes remain diﬃcult to explain. We also find much unexplained heterogene-
ity in individual responses to diﬀerent decision tasks. We conclude by discussing
potential issues underlying this heterogeneity, and indicating potential solutions.
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1 Introduction
Ambiguity aversion—the preference for known-probability outcome generating processes
over normatively equivalent processes in which exact probabilities are not known—has
attracted considerable interest since the publication of Daniel Ellsberg’s seminal article
in 1961. In particular, ambiguity aversion has been indicated as a potential explanation
of a wide range of economic outcomes in theoretical models. To name but a few, Mukerji
(1998) used ambiguity aversion to explain the existence of incomplete contracts, Easly
and O’Hara (2009) used it to explain the stock market participation bias, and Bryan
(2010) hypothesised that ambiguity aversion may be causing the low uptake of insurance
in developing countries in the presence of basis risk, while Alary, Gollier and Treich
(2013) studied the demand for insurance and self-protection under ambiguity aversion.
Berger, Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2013) modelled the incidence of ambiguity aversion
on treatment decisions where ambiguity could aﬀect either the diagnosis or the treatment
itself, with diﬀerent consequences for medical decisions.
Given the importance ambiguity attitudes have been ascribed in the determination
of economic outcomes, it seems crucial to know whether the phenomenon is universal, or
whether there exist qualitative or quantitative diﬀerences across countries. In this paper,
we examine cross-country diﬀerences in ambiguity preferences using a rich dataset ob-
tained in experiments with close to 3,000 students from 30 countries.1 We further obtain
rich measurements of preferences at the individual level, which allow us to investigate
the variation of ambiguity attitudes over probability levels (ambiguity-insensitivity to
1These data were first presented by Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk
and Martinsson (2015a). The latter paper examined risk preferences and uncertainty preferences aggre-
gated over individual choices, and their correlation with survey measures of preferences. It did not in
any way discuss ambiguity preferences (here defined as the diﬀerence between risk and uncertainty pref-
erences—see below). A second paper based on a subset of the same data, L’Haridon and Vieider (2016),
presents a structural analysis of decision making under risk, and does not use the data on uncertainty.
We will refer to the latter to contrast our findings for ambiguity to those for risk in the same data set.
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probabilities, or a-insensitivity) and for gains versus losses (domain-dependence). This
is important inasmuch as ambiguity attitudes have been found to diﬀer systematically
across these dimensions (see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015, for a detailed survey),
and since such systematic patterns serve to discriminate between diﬀerent theoretical
accounts of behaviour under ambiguity (Baillon and Bleichrodt, 2015).
The conclusions we draw from the data are mixed. At the country level, ambigu-
ity aversion is the standard pattern, albeit with significant quantitative diﬀerences be-
tween countries. We also find systematic patterns across prospect characteristics, with
a-insensitivity prevailing everywhere, and less ambiguity aversion for losses than for gains
(although we fail to find much evidence of ambiguity seeking for either losses or small
probabilities, as found in many previous studies; see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
We furthermore manage to explain cross-country diﬀerences in ambiguity attitudes re-
curring to a set of standard variables from the macroeconomic literature.
This picture changes once we move to lower levels of analysis. We find consider-
able heterogeneity between subjects, but our best attempts at explaining this variance
bear little fruit. At 3% of the variance at the individual level explained by our best
model, unexplained heterogeneity remains large even measured against the dismal stan-
dard of explaining individual variation in risk preferences (von Gaudecker, van Soest and
Wengström, 2011; L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016). This variation could be due either to
systematic noise in the responses of some individuals, or to ambiguity attitudes consti-
tuting an idiosyncratic trait that is orthogonal to observable characteristics—an issue to
which we will return in the discussion.
The situation does not improve when we try to explain diﬀerences in behaviour de-
pending on prospect characteristics. A model accounting for all possible prospect char-
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acteristics manages to explain a mere 10-19% of the residual variance. We interpret the
unexplained variance at this level as noise, given the common definition of the latter as
capturing calculation mistakes, random responses, or response patterns not captured by
the model fit to the data (Train, 2009). The extent of the noise at this level becomes
even more evident when comparing it to the performance of the same model for risk
preferences, where the explained variance hovers around 75%.
We are not alone in finding poor predictive performance of experimentally measured
ambiguity attitudes (for an exception, see Muthukrishnan, Wathieu and Xu, 2009). Giné,
Townsend and Vickery (2008) tried to relate experimentally measured ambiguity aver-
sion to insurance uptake in a large field experiment in India, but found no correlation.
Borghans, Heckman, Golsteyn and Meijers (2009) found cognitive and psychological char-
acteristics to be predictive of risk attitudes, but not of ambiguity attitudes. Binmore,
Stewart and Voorhoeve (2012) could not find any stable demographic correlates of ambi-
guity attitudes (as well as finding low ambiguity aversion in general; see also Ahn, Choi,
Gale and Kariv, 2014). Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler and Trautmann (2013) found
only weak predictive power of experimentally measured ambiguity attitudes for the be-
haviour of adolescents. Stahl (2014) also detected high levels of noise in an experimental
study of ambiguity attitudes. Even Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2015a), while
finding some correlations in a representative sample of the Dutch population, manage to
explain at most around 5% in the variation of their ambiguity indices—a proportion that
roughly corresponds to the one we report in our own data.
We cannot fully exclude that some of these findings may be driven by our measure-
ment method. We measure ambiguity attitudes using two certainty equivalents (CEs),
one for risk (known probabilities) and one for uncertainty (unknown probabilities), and
4
construct an ambiguity premium from the diﬀerence of the two. CEs have been shown to
provide an unbiased measure of ambiguity attitudes (Trautmann, Vieider and Wakker,
2011), and they are popular in the literature (Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker,
2011; Sutter et al., 2013). They are easily to implement, including in paper-and-pencil
experiments, straightforward to incentivize, and they have the great advantage of be-
ing simple to administer and to understand. Furthermore, they allow for a model-free
analysis of ambiguity attitudes. Given that the method consists of two separate mea-
surements for risk and uncertainty attitudes, there could, however, be an accumulation
of error terms when deriving our ambiguity premia. Some recent papers have used direct
measurements of ambiguity aversion by matching probabilities, and have reported some
success in correlating the measures to real world behaviour (Dimmock et al., 2015a; Dim-
mock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg, 2015b). We will provide a more detailed
examination of measurement errors across diﬀerent tasks in the discussion.
We do not mean to conclude from our results that ambiguity aversion is not an
empirically meaningful concept. The use of abstract urns and the comparison of extreme
situations of completely known and completely unknown probabilities, however, seem
to induce high levels of inconsistencies in responses, which may well result from the
salient and artificially induced absence of information from one of the urns (Frisch and
Baron, 1988; Fox and Tversky, 1995). These issues may then be further exacerbated
by measurement problems, which are also well-known in the risk preference literature.
One solution for applied empirical researchers may then be to recur to more natural
sources of uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon, Huang, Selim andWakker, 2016b).
In addition, it appears crucial to obtain a better understanding of measurement issues
aﬀecting our estimates of ambiguity attitudes, and comparative evidence on the relative
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merit of diﬀerent measurement tools. We will return to both these issues in the discussion.
2 Experiment and analysis
2.1 The experiment
We conducted the same experiment in 30 countries. The countries were selected with an
eye to diversification along several dimensions that were deemed potentially important
for our study. These included inter alia geographic representation and extension, level
of income per capita, and importance in economic and population terms. A total of
2939 subjects participated in the experimental sessions. Students were used since they
were deemed more comparable across countries than other population groups. Subjects
were recruited at major public universities in the diﬀerent countries, with a few exceptions
where no collaborators at public universities could be found (Brazil, Guatemala, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia). Care was taken to obtain a subject sample that was balanced
in terms of sex and study major, although this was not always successful (e.g. in Saudi
Arabia only males could be recruited because our male contact was not allowed to interact
with female students). In universities with a standing subject pool we only recruited
subjects who had participated in at most 2 experiments before, so that they would be
similar to subjects in developing countries for whom experiments were new. Appendix A
provides a summary of the main subject characteristics country by country.
All experiments were run between September 2011 and October 2012. Experiments
across countries were kept as comparable as possible. The experiment was run in the
teaching language of the university, since many countries included in the study are multi-
lingual, so that the oﬃcial teaching language is the only one shared by all students.
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Instructions were translated from English and back-translated into English by a diﬀerent
person (Brislin, 1970). Diﬀerences were then eliminated by discussion. The payoﬀs were
carefully converted using World Bank PPP data and then double checked using PPP
conversion rates calculated from net wages of student assistants at the university where
the experiments took place. Vieider (2012) tested explicitly whether small variations in
payoﬀs in the order of ±20% would make a diﬀerence in terms of measured risk or uncer-
tainty attitudes and found none. Also, the experiment was run in two diﬀerent cities in
China—Beijing and Shanghai—and on two diﬀerent campuses in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
to determine whether diﬀerences found could be ascribed to diﬀerences in the subject
pool, which would be troubling for an international comparison. No such diﬀerences
were found once observable subject characteristics had been controlled for—see Vieider,
Chmura, Fisher, Kusakawa, Martinsson, Mattison Thompson and Sunday (2015b). Sub-
jects were reassured of their anonymity—an element that is potentially important for
measures of ambiguity, as the potential for scrutiny may increase ambiguity aversion
(Baltussen, van den Assem and van Dolder, 2016).
We elicited certainty equivalents for 44 binary prospects which diﬀered by outcomes,
probabilities, decision domain (gains versus losses) and source of uncertainty (known
probabilities versus vague probabilities). In this paper, we concentrate specifically on the
16 pairs of prospects that were administered both using objective and vague probabilities.
Table 1 shows the decision tasks used in this paper, where a single prospects is represented
as (p: x; y), where p is the probability of winning or losing x, and y obtains with a
probability 1  p. For our main analysis, we will focus on the prospect pairs with y = 0,
since this simplifies our analysis considerably at little or no cost in terms of insights. We
use the four additional prospect pairs with a lower outcome y 6= 0 for consistency checks
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and out-of-sample predictions.
Subjects were asked to make a choice between the prospect and diﬀerent sure amounts
of money contained between y and x. For gains, the sure amounts increased from y to x.
For losses, the sure amount decreased from  y to  x. For gains, subjects will generally
choose the prospect for small sure amounts and switch to preferring the sure amount
as the latter gets larger (and vice versa for losses). The certainty equivalent (CE ) of a
subject was encoded as the average of the last sure amount for which the prospect was
chosen and the first sure amount chosen (vice versa for losses).
Table 1: decision tasks, amounts in PPP Euros
gains losses
(1/8: 20;0) (1/8: -20;0)
(1/8: 20;5) (1/8: -20;-5)
(2/8: 20;0) (2/8: - 20;0)
(3/8: 20;0) (3/8: -20;0)
(5/8: 20;0) (5/8: -20;0)
(6/8: 20;0) (6/8: -20;0)
(7/8: 20;0) (7/8: -20;0)
(7/8: 20;5) (7/8: -20;-5)
The tasks were distributed across diﬀerent categories and domains (see online ap-
pendix for the full experimental instructions). By decision domain we mean that choices
were framed either as gains or as losses. Losses were always administered in a second
part of the experiment and took place from an endowment. This endowment was given
conditional on the second part being selected for real play, and was equivalent to the
highest loss of e20 no matter what the selected choice. Etchart-Vincent and L’Haridon
(2011) tested whether decisions from an endowment are diﬀerent from decisions involving
real losses and found no diﬀerences. In each of the two domains, we had tasks with known
probabilities, which we call risky ; and decisions involving unknown probabilities, which
we call uncertain. The tasks were always kept in the same order, starting with risky gains
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and then uncertain gains; and in a second part, risky losses followed by uncertain losses.
This was done so as to facilitate the logistics and avoid mix-ups, as well as to reduce
the cognitive burden on subjects. A large-scale pilot with 330 subjects showed that such
a fixed ordering was less demanding for subjects, while not significantly aﬀecting the
measures used in this paper.
Figure 1: Risky urn (left) and uncertain urn (right)
An example of the representation of risky and uncertainty urns, which follows the
representation used by Abdellaoui et al. (2011), can be seen in figure 1. In the experi-
ment, the urns were not called risky or uncertain, but rather “transparent” and “opaque”.
Concerning the risky urn, subjects simply learned that the urn contained exactly eight
balls, numbered from 1 to 8 inclusive. About the uncertain urn they were told: “you can-
not see what numbers the balls contained in the urn have. This means that you do not
know the exact numbers that are present in that urn. All balls bear a number between
1 and 8 inclusive (have either 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , or 8 written on them), but it is
possible that some numbers are absent from this urn while others occur repeatedly. Thus
you do not know the exact composition of the urn.” This implementation of uncertainty
permits to centre the uncertainty around a known probability distribution. In this sense,
a prospect oﬀering a given prize when a ball with the number 1 or 2 is extracted oﬀers a
vague probability interval that is centred on a probability of 2/8. The vagueness derives
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from the fact that the probability may in reality be lower or higher than 2/8.
Due to logistic reasons, we could not allow subjects to choose the colours on which to
bet. This may result in distrust of the experimenter to contaminate the results (Charness,
Karni and Levin, 2013), although others studies failed to find such eﬀects (Oechssler and
Roomets, 2015), and the evidence accumulated to date on the relevance of this issue is
inconclusive (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). We took two steps to counteract this
issue. First, we explicitly encouraged subjects to check the contents of the ambiguous urn
after the experiment. This was meant to reassure them that, while some balls could be
absent from the urn as described in the instructions, we did not systematically manipulate
the urn to their disadvantage. Second, we conducted a pilot on whether letting subjects
choose the winning number of the balls would make a diﬀerence in our particular design.
We did not find any evidence that this was the case—the online appendix provides details
about this pilot. We will furthermore see in due time that the data do not appear to
support explanations based on suspicion against the experimenter (see also Dimmock et
al., 2015b, for further evidence on this).2
2.2 Analysis and econometrics
For our analysis, we construct ambiguity premia in the following way. We have eight
certainty equivalents (CEs) for uncertain gains and eight CEs for uncertain losses. We
contrast them with the equivalent risky CEs for which probabilities are known. The
ambiguity premium is then defined as:
2One may also argue that, in some sense, dislike of asymmetric knowledge by the experimenter is
a part of ambiguity aversion. For instance, Chow and Sarin (2002) showed that subjects disliked the
information asymmetry inherent in the ambiguity problem, even when distrust of the experimenter was
completely excluded.
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⇡si =
cersi   ceusi
xsi   ysi , (1)
where the subscript s indicates the sign (gains or losses), i indicates the probability level
or prospect, and the superscripts r and u indicate risk and uncertainty respectively.3 The
division by the outcome range of the prospect serves to normalise the value of the certainty
equivalent. A CE under uncertainty that is smaller than the corresponding CE under risk
thus indicates ambiguity aversion for both gains and losses. The normalization allows
us to interpret the diﬀerence directly on a probability scale. For instance, an ambiguity
premium of 0.1 signifies that a decision maker is willing to give up an additional 10
percentage points of the probability of winning the extra prize x   y in order to avoid
ambiguity, measured against her risk aversion.
Our index of ambiguity attitudes is completely model-free. To show this, it is instruc-
tive to examine the relation of our ambiguity premium to other measures used in the
literature, and particularly the ones derived from matching probabilities by Dimmock et
al. (2015a). Following the latter in applying the source method of Abdellaoui et al. (2011)
to our stimuli (see Dimmock et al., 2015a, section 3.2 for a detailed discussion of the the-
oretical assumptions), and dropping the subscripts si to the prospect characteristics to
avoid notational clutter, we can define our certainty equivalent under risk as
cer = u 1 [wrs(p)u(x) + (1  wrs(p))u(y)] (2)
where u is a utility function transforming outcomes into utiles, and w is a source- or
probability weighting function transforming probabilities into decision weights, and the
3In particular, we can obtain a normalised certainty equivalent for risk, ⇡rsi =
cersi ysi
xsi ysi , and a nor-
malised certainty equivalent for uncertainty, ⇡usi =
ceusi ysi
xsi ysi . Equation 1 then results from ⇡
r
si   ⇡usi.
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power  1 indicates the inverse of the utility function. The superscript r to w serves to
remind us that this function is applied to objectively given probabilities or risk, while the
subscript s emphasises its sign-dependence. Now take an uncertain event E to represent
likelihoods in our uncertain urn. Assigning a probability P (E) to the uncertain event,
we can now derive the CE under uncertainty as follows:
ceu = U 1 [wus (P (E))U(x) + (1  wus (P (E)))U(y)] , (3)
where U denotes utility under uncertainty, and the superscript u to w indicates that this is
the source function for uncertainty. Assuming y = 0 for simplicity (the reasoning is similar
for y 6= 0), and normalizing utility such that u(0) = U(0) = 0 and u(x) = U(x) = 1, we
can write the ambiguity premium as
⇡ =
u 1[wrs(p)]  U 1[wus (P (E))]
x  y . (4)
Equation 4 shows that our ambiguity premia capture not only diﬀerences in decision
weights, but also any potential diﬀerences in utility between risk and uncertainty. By
assuming equality in utility between risk and uncertainty, matching probabilities only
capture diﬀerences in decision weights. Thus if utility is diﬀerent between risk and uncer-
tainty but decision weights are not, the matching probabilities will not detect ambiguity
attitudes, but our ambiguity premia will.
We analyse the data using a hierarchical or multilevel model with three levels of
analysis (see Snijders and Bosker, 2012, for an introduction to multilevel modelling). Our
fundamental unit of analysis are ambiguity premia for single prospect comparisons, of the
type indicated in equation 1. The next higher level is constituted by subjects, so that
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the standard errors are clustered at that level and we can capture the between-subject
variance. The highest level is constituted by countries. We express this as
⇡inc =  0 +Xinc nc + ⌫c + µnc + "inc, (5)
where i is now a running index including all prospect characteristics, having dropped
s to avoid notation overload. The part Xinc nc constitutes the so-called fixed part of
the model, with X containing observable characteristics at the prospect (i), individual
(n), and country (c) level, and   constituting a vector of regression coeﬃcients. The
remaining part of the equation is referred to as the random part, with ⌫c capturing
the random intercept at the country level, and µnc the random intercept at the subject
level. These two terms thus capture systematic variation in the residuals at these two
levels. The remaining term "inc captures the residual variance of the model. By using an
empty set of observables X and dropping the fixed part of the model, we can estimate a
baseline model that purely quantifies the variance at the diﬀerent levels of analysis. The
extent to which the variance at various levels is reduced by adding independent variables
at the diﬀerent levels to X then serves to assess our success in explaining the overall
variation in the data. We will run all regressions separately for gains and losses. While it
is in principle possible to run one large regression on all ambiguity premia, this requires
interaction terms to be included at all times, given the opposite signs for gains and losses.
Running two separate regressions for gains and losses thus avoids having to run triple
interactions when considering crossed eﬀects.
The random intercepts captured in ⌫ and µ allow the intercept to be diﬀerent by
country and by subject within countries and thus capture general diﬀerences in ambiguity
aversion, while the regressands contained in X are forced to show the same eﬀect for the
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whole sample. This has the advantage of quantifying the variance at each level, while
adjusting the standard errors for the level of analysis. While the above model constitutes a
first step in the direction of accounting for heterogeneity on various levels, the assumption
of equal eﬀects of observable characteristics across diﬀerent levels is still unsatisfactory.
In particular, we may want to allow for the possibility that individual-level regression
results may diﬀer between countries, for instance, to what extent the gender eﬀect in
ambiguity attitudes is diﬀerent across countries. We thus amend our model by allowing
for so-called random slopes:
⇡inc =  0 +Xinc nc + Yin⌫c + Ziµnc + "inc. (6)
Thus we now also allow the eﬀects of prospect and individual characteristics to diﬀer
across subjects and countries. For instance, Yin may contain both prospect characteristics,
such as the probability of winning in a given prospect, and individual characteristics, such
as for instance a female dummy. The prospect characteristic would capture diﬀerences in
the eﬀect of prospect characteristics across countries, in our example diﬀerential eﬀects of
the probability of winning across countries. For the latter, we may furthermore observe
diﬀerences across subjects, e.g. diﬀerent subjects may react diﬀerently to the probability
of winning. This is captured by inserting prospect characteristics as random slopes at
the individual level into Zi.
The results then correspond to those of an OLS regression, with standard errors
adjusted for the specific level of analysis. The probability inserted as an explanatory
characteristic into matrix Y will allow us to quantify a-insensitivity, the phenomenon
by which ambiguity attitudes change less than proportionally with the probability of
winning. Technically, a-insensitivity in a given country is indeed simply measured by
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the regression coeﬃcient of probability at this level, with a positive value indicating a-
insensitivity, a zero coeﬃcient indicating perfect sensitivity, and a negative coeﬃcient
indicating excess sensitivity. The random intercept measures the level of ambiguity aver-
sion. Inserting the probability into Z will achieve the same at the individual level, i.e. it
will capture heterogeneity in reactions to probabilities across subjects.4 Finally, inserting
the probability into the fixed part X and comparing this to a baseline model empty of
covariates will allow us to determine to what extent we can reduce the residual variance
" by controlling for this prospect characteristic.
3 Results
We present the results in several steps. We start with a nonparametric analysis of the
ambiguity premia. We then proceed to documenting diﬀerences between countries using
random intercepts—which serve to quantify country-level diﬀerences in aggregate am-
biguity aversion—and random slopes for probability—which quantify between-country
diﬀerences in a-insensitivity. We then quantify the variance in the data and explore the
extent to which we can explain the overall level of variance observed at each of the three
levels—between countries, between individuals, and between ambiguity premia.
3.1 Descriptive results
We start by presenting some descriptives of the nonparametric data. Figure 2 shows the
average ambiguity premia per country, together with their 95% confidence intervals. The
premia were obtained in the following way. We first calculated the average ambiguity
4This linear regression approach is again close in spirit to the approach used by Dimmock et al.
(2015a). Indeed, it can be shown that under the assumption of linear utility and neoadditive probability
weighting, our indices are closely related to theirs, although they do not coincide exactly.
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premium per subject, separately for gains and losses. We then took the average of this
mean premium per country, again separately by decision domain.
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Figure 2: Average ambiguity premia by country for gains and losses with 95% confidence intervals
Figure 2(a) shows the premia thus obtained for gains. We find significant ambiguity
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aversion on average in all countries. At the same time, there is significant heterogeneity
in average ambiguity attitudes across countries. The premia can be interpreted on a
probability scale, meaning that for instance subjects in Belgium are on average willing
to sacrifice 10 percentage points of the probability of winning to play a risky rather than
an ambiguous prospect. Figure 2(b) shows the average ambiguity premia per country for
losses, where a positive premium now indicates ambiguity seeking. Most country premia
are negative, showing that the prevalent pattern is still one of ambiguity aversion. This
ambiguity aversion is considerably weaker than for gains (with the exception of Cambodia,
where ambiguity aversion for losses is extremely strong). For a few countries, such as
Peru, Tunisia, and the UK, we cannot exclude ambiguity neutrality, while Nigeria again
stands out from the general trend, this time by showing ambiguity seeking. Lower levels of
ambiguity aversion for losses than for gains are consistent with previous evidence. Cohen,
Jaﬀray and Said (1987) found ambiguity aversion for gains, but ambiguity neutrality for
losses. Similar results were obtained among others by Friedl, Miranda and Schmidt
(2014). We do, however, not find much evidence for ambiguity seeking for losses. This
contrasts with the previous literature, where most of the studies report either ambiguity
neutrality or ambiguity seeking for losses (see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
We have so far only looked at average attitudes per subject. This masks the fact
that ambiguity attitudes have been found to diﬀer systematically across the probability
spectrum (Tversky and Fox, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Figure 3 depicts ambiguity
attitudes by probability level, aggregating over the whole sample across subjects and
countries. For gains, we find relatively low ambiguity aversion for small probabilities,
with ambiguity aversion increasing as probabilities get larger. A jump occurs between
p = 3/8 and p = 5/8, which suggests that people are particularly insensitive to changes
17
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Figure 3: Ambiguity aversion by probability
in probability to either side of p = 0.5. For losses, we find the exact opposite pattern.
Ambiguity aversion starts out large for small probabilities, and becomes smaller as proba-
bilities increase, resulting in a trend towards ambiguity seeking for the largest probability
(although this fails to reach significance in the aggregate data). There also is a similar
jump around the middle of the probability spectrum as observed for gains.
Most previous studies have found ambiguity seeking for small probability gains (Dim-
mock et al., 2015a), but some have found attitudes closer to ambiguity neutrality for
the same type of prospects (Abdellaoui et al., 2011). The reason for this may well be
that previous studies that found ambiguity seeking used comparative environments, in
which uncertainty was directly compared to risk. In our design there is no direct compar-
ison, and we elicited certainty equivalents for risk and uncertainty separately, in separate
blocks of the experiment. It is well known that ambiguity attitudes are strongest in
settings that allow for the direct comparison of objectively given and vague probabilities
(Fox and Tversky, 1995; Chow and Sarin, 2001). In this sense, our measures can be seen
as a lower bound on ambiguity attitudes. Bouchouicha, Martinsson, Medhin and Vieider
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(2016) furthermore report evidence that a-insensitivity increases in monetary stakes, so
that ambiguity seeking for small probabilities may only emerge at higher stake levels.
While they found no evidence for ambiguity seeking at small probabilities for the stake
levels used here, such ambiguity seeking started to emerge once stakes were doubled.
3.2 Ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity by country
We start our parametric analysis by quantifying the aggregate ambiguity aversion and
a-insensitivity at the country level for gains and losses. We quantify the two measures by
running multilevel regressions separately for gains and losses, and using probability as the
sole explanatory variable, whereby we normalise the probability to be centred around 0.5
(i.e., we take p  0.5). We further obtain random slopes for probabilities at the country
level, allowing us to investigate diﬀerences in a-insensitivity across countries.
Figure 4 shows scatter plots of the two measures for gains and losses, with panel 4(a)
showing a scatter plot of ambiguity attitudes for gains and losses, and panel 4(b) showing
a scatter plot of a-insensitivity for gains and losses. Ambiguity attitudes for gains and
losses show a clear negative correlation at the country level (⇢ =  0.44, p = 0.017). Given
the inverse interpretation for gains and losses, this means that ambiguity aversion for
gains is negatively correlated with ambiguity seeking for losses. A-insensitivity, indicated
in panel 4(b), shows a clear positive correlation across domains (⇢ = 0.74, p < 0.001).
Overall, the patterns we observe at the country level thus indicate a remarkable stability
of ambiguity attitudes between gains and losses.
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3.3 Explaining residual variance (within-subjects)
We will now try and see how much of the variation in ambiguity premia we can explain
at the prospect or premium level, or in other words, to what extent we can explain the
residual variance in our model. Table 2 shows regressions of the ambiguity premia on a
number of prospect characteristics. The first data column presents a benchmark model
empty of covariates that serves purely to quantify the variance at the various levels. At
the residual level, we observe a value of 0.043 for gains, corresponding to about 84%
of the overall variance. The picture is similar for losses, where again about 84% of the
variance is to be found at the residual level.5 The goal of the subsequent regressions will
now be to see how much of this variance we can explain through characteristics of the
choice problem.
Table 2: Residual level regressions
gains (ambiguity aversion) losses (ambiguity seeking)
benchmark model I model II model III benchmark model I model II model III
probability 0.168*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
p > 0.5 dummy 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
random slopes X X
constant 0.083*** -0.001 0.013* 0.011* -0.034*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.079***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
country VAR 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
subject VAR 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
residual VAR 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
observations 17629 17629 17629 17629 17605 17605 17605 17605
countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
log-likelihood 1535.487 1968.557 1980.767 2372.240 1426.181 1557.752 1557.908 1661.871
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model I adds the most basic characteristic of the decision problem—the probability
of winning the prize. This probability shows a positive eﬀect for both gains and losses,
indicating a-insensitivity, whereby ambiguity aversion (seeking) increases in probabilities
5The proportion of variance occurring at the residual level is influenced by our decision to analyse
gains and losses separately. Given the large heterogeneity between domains, the variance at the residual
level increases to 95% when we enter both domains jointly into the regressions. The subsequent analysis,
however, does not change in any substantive way by treating the two decision domains separately.
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for gains (losses). The eﬀect is weaker for losses than it is for gains, further confirming
the eﬀects already discussed at the country level. The proportion of variance explained
by this variable is, however, rather modest, amounting to 4.7% of the overall residual
variance for gains and only 2.3% for losses. Model II further adds a dummy indicating
whether the probability is larger than 0.5. This is motivated by the jump observed in
figure 3, and performs better than for instance inserting the square of the probability.
Inserting this dummy constitutes a significant improvement in terms of goodness of fit
relative to model I for gains ( 2(1) = 24.42, p < 0.001; likelihood ratio test), but not
for losses ( 2(1) = 0.38, p = 0.578). The improvement in terms of variance explained
remains, however, quite modest, with a mere 0.2% of the variance explained relative to
model I for gains (and no improvement for losses).
Model III further adds random slopes to our model. That is, we let the eﬀect of
probabilities and of the p > 0.5 dummy be diﬀerent from subject to subject (i.e., we
insert the random slopes at the next higher level, while keeping the random intercept
model at the country level). For gains, we find significant variance to be captured both by
the probability and the probability cutoﬀ dummy, resulting in a significant improvement
of fit relative to model II ( 2(2) = 782.95, p < 0.001). We can explain 14% of the
variance remaining unexplained in model II, which brings us to 19% of the overall residual
variance being explained by prospect characteristics. For losses the picture is similar,
albeit somewhat more muted. While there is a clear improvement in model fit ( 2(2) =
207.93, p < 0.001), no significant variance is explained by the random slope for probability.
There is, however, significant variance being explained by the individual level random
slope of the cutoﬀ dummy. The variance explained improves by 8.9% relative to model
II, which brings us to 10.5% relative to the overall residual variance.
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The regressions just discussed show that choices are systematically related to prospect
characteristics. The relatively large improvement between model II and model III, where
we allowed reactions to probabilities to diﬀer between subjects, further shows that there
is considerable individual heterogeneity in reactions to prospect characteristics. Nonethe-
less, our success in explaining overall variance is modest, with 81% of the residual variance
at the premium level remaining unexplained in our best-performing model III for gains,
and fully 89.5% for losses. We can put this figure into context by comparing it to the same
figure for risk, obtained by running the exact same models directly on the normalised cer-
tainty equivalent for risk, ceris. The equivalent of model I above for risk, using probability
alone to explain choices and assuming uniform eﬀects across subjects, can explain 58% of
the residual variance for gains. For losses, the figure is 61%. Further adding probability
squared (which for risk works better than the cutoﬀ dummy) and allowing for random
eﬀects to emulate model III, we manage to explain 73% of the total residual variance for
gains, and 75% for losses (i.e. only 25-27% of the residual variance remains unexplained).
The large level of residual variance that remains unexplained by prospect character-
istics for ambiguity is particularly surprising in the light of the observation that no other
prospect characteristics exist that one could conceivably control for (given that other
nonlinear elements we tried did not show any eﬀect). We thus conclude from this that
the largest part of the variance—indeed around 80% for gains and 90% for losses—would
appear to consist of pure noise (defined as inconsistency of behaviour with our modelling
assumptions). We next explore to what extent we can uncover more stable patterns once
we take the analysis to higher levels of analysis and aggregate across the single choices.
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3.4 Explaining individual variance
We next try to explain the variance at the individual level. Table 3 shows a number
of regressions on individual characteristics. All regressions also control for the prime
characteristics at the premium level—the probability of winning, and the probability
cutoﬀ dummy at 0.5. The proportion of the overall variance occurring at the individual
level is highly significant, and constitutes 17.6% for the overall variance for gains, and
15.8% for losses.6
Model I regresses the ambiguity premium on biological characteristics, including a
female dummy and the age of the respondent (entered as a z-score), and on study char-
acteristics, including the (z-score of) grade point average (GPA) and a series of dummies
capturing the study major. We find women to be more ambiguity averse than men for
gains. This corresponds to the findings of Powell and Ansic (1997), while Borghans et
al. (2009) and Dimmock et al. (2015b) found an eﬀect going in the opposite direction,
and Dimmock et al. (2015a) found no gender eﬀect. There is no gender eﬀect for losses.
We also register some eﬀects of study characteristics, but none of them are consistent
between gains and losses. For gains, we find arts students to be less ambiguity averse,
while medicine students are more ambiguity averse (marginally significant). For losses,
we find a correlation indicating that students with a higher GPA tend to be more am-
biguity averse—contrary to what one might expect if ambiguity aversion is taken to be
a decision bias. The regression performs poorly in terms of the variance explained. For
gains, Model I explains 1% of the variance in the benchmark model, an improvement that
6These figures obtain after controlling for the prospect caracteristics of the probability of winning and
the probability cutoﬀ at p = 0.5. The proportion of variance occurring at the individual level without
the inclusion of these controls is somewhat lower, coming to 16% for gains and 15.4% for losses. We
take the model including the prospect characteristics as our benchmark model, since we later need those
characteristics when inserting crossed eﬀects, and this could result in explained variance decreasing (i.e.,
the proportion of remaining variance increasing) relative to the benchmark model if it were not to include
those characteristics because of the decrease in residual variance.
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is only marginally significant ( 2(10) = 17.33, p = 0.067). For losses, the improvement is
significant ( 2(10) = 21.11, p = 0.020), but at 1.3% the proportion of variance explained
remains underwhelming.
Table 3: Individual level regressions
gains (ambiguity aversion) losses (ambiguity seeking)
model I model II model III model IV model I model II model III model IV
female 0.010** 0.008* 0.020** 0.021*** -0.005 -0.004 0.015 0.013
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010)
age 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
GPA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009** -0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
mathematics 0.004 0.004 -0.014 -0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.016 -0.018
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014)
natural sciences -0.010 -0.010 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.053* 0.048*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.025)
medicine 0.019* 0.019* -0.041** -0.041** 0.002 0.003 -0.016 -0.017
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.042) (0.042)
social sciences -0.010 -0.011 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.027 0.025
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
humanities -0.006 -0.007 0.013 0.013 -0.011 -0.011 0.007 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
arts -0.028** -0.027** 0.033* 0.041* 0.002 0.002 0.056** 0.044**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
study other -0.014* -0.014* -0.016* -0.016* 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
power distance -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
individualism 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
uncertainty avoid. -0.000 0.002* 0.002* 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
masculinity -0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
female*prob. -0.024 -0.023 -0.038** -0.038**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
natural*prob. -0.047* -0.047* -0.076 -0.077
(0.026) (0.026) (0.048) (0.048)
medicine*prob. 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.038 0.038
(0.045) (0.045) (0.063) (0.063)
arts*prob. -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.031) (0.031)
other*prob. 0.255*** 0.270*** -0.176*** -0.181***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
power*prob. -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* -0.004*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
mascul.*prob. -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
prospect char. X X X X X X X X
random slopes X X
constant 0.012 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.036*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
country VAR 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
individual VAR 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
residual VAR 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 17629 17629 17629 17629 17605 17605 17605 17605
Subjects 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
log likelihood 1989.434 1991.725 2051.410 2057.241 1568.462 1568.961 1602.948 1612.540
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All interaction with probability are included win models II and III, but only the significant ones are shown
Model II further adds responses to a questionnaire eliciting cultural attitudes devel-
25
oped by Hofstede (1980). The cultural attitudes are then grouped into four dimen-
sion or attitudes—individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and power dis-
tance—amongst which especially uncertainty avoidance has been indicated to capture
something akin to ambiguity aversion (see also Rieger, Wang and Hens, 2014, for corre-
lations with risk aversion). For gains, we observe a marginally significant positive cor-
relation between individualism and ambiguity aversion, while we observe no significant
correlations with losses. The model does not represent a significant improvement over
model I either for gains ( 2(4) = 4.58, p = 0.333) or for losses ( 2(4) = 1.00, p = 0.910).
Using aggregate country-level measures of the Hofstede measures jointly with individual
deviations instead of the individual measures used here does not improve these results.
Model III adds interaction eﬀects to model II. That is, all individual-level variables
included in model II are crossed with the probability of winning. This allows us not only
to investigate average ambiguity attitudes at the individual level as done previously, but
also whether a-insensitivity varies with subject characteristics. The probability is always
recentered to make p = 0.5 coincide with zero, so as to facilitate the interpretation of
the pure eﬀects. This model constitutes a significant improvement over model II both
for gains ( 2(14) = 119.37, p < 0.001) and for losses ( 2(14) = 67.97, p < 0.001). Some
interesting eﬀects emerge (we only show significant interactions in the table to keep it
tractable). For gains, we now find medicine students to be less ambiguity averse than
economics students, a correlation between a high score on masculinity and ambiguity
aversion, and a marginally significant positive correlation between uncertainty avoidance
and ambiguity aversion (individualism is no longer significant). These eﬀects are balanced
by eﬀects on a-insensitivity, with medicine students being considerably more a-insensitive
compared to economics students, and masculinity being associated with slightly reduced
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a-insensitivity. Once again, however, these eﬀects are not reproduced for losses, where
some other eﬀects emerge, such as women being less a-insensitive than men and arts
students being both more ambiguity averse than economics students and less a-insensitive.
Finally, model IV allows for random slopes at the country level for some basic char-
acteristics (biological and study characteristics). This further improves the fit relative to
model III for both gains ( 2(4) = 11.66, p = 0.020) and losses ( 2(4) = 19.18, p < 0.001).
More interesting, however, is to determine to what extent we have succeeded in explaining
the individual level variance. For gains, model IV explains about 2.7% of the individual
level variance. For losses, the figure is 3.6%. These figures look low even compared to the
low standards for risk preferences, where large unexplained heterogeneity at the individual
level is the norm (von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Although they reach similar conclusions,
L’Haridon and Vieider (2016) found several explanatory variables to be significant at the
individual level, and remarkable consistency in these eﬀects between gains and losses. It
is also informative to once again consider the interclass correlation coeﬃcient (ICC ) at
the individual level.7 For ambiguity, we found it to be in the range of 0.15-0.18, indicating
that any two randomly chosen choices from one randomly chosen individual would have a
correlation of 0.15-0.18. For risk, the equivalent range is 0.38-0.40—still far from perfect,
but a clear improvement over the figure for ambiguity.
We can but conclude this section in a similar vein as for the premium level section
above. While we can account for some heterogeneity in the data at the individual level
recurring to observable characteristics of the decision makers, the proportion of variance
thus explained is low both in absolute terms, as well as in comparison to results for risk
preferences.
7The ICC is defined as the proportion of overall variance captured at the individual level. Let  n
be the variance at the individual level in a model empty of covariates, and let  c be the country level
variance and  ⇢ the residual varaince. We then have ICCn =  n n+ c+ ⇢ .
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3.5 Explaining country-level variance
We once again start by quantifying the variance occurring at this level, based on the
benchmark model, which in this case comprises both prospect characteristics as above
and some basic individual characteristics (sex, age, and GPA). We find the ICC to be
very low at 0.8% for both gains and losses.8 This is, however, a relative figure, rendered
artificially low by the massive amount of residual variance discussed above. Indeed, we
have seen in the descriptive country comparison at the beginning of the results section
that countries do significantly diﬀer in terms of their ambiguity attitudes (as is also ap-
parent from the high statistical significance of the variance at the country level).9 It thus
seems well worth our while to try and account for this variance by the use of country-level
indicators. Prime candidates for such indicators are economic, geographical, and insti-
tutional variables as used in the macroeconomic literature on comparative development
and growth. Once again, we mainly focus on the extent to which we can explain the
between-country variance.
Table 4 shows the regression results. The benchmark model again serves to quantify
the variance occurring at this level, which we show multiplied by 1000 in the table to
be able to discern changes across regressions. Model I introduces income and institu-
tional variables. The income variables include GDP per capita (in PPP and taking logs;
8 These figures are also low compared to previous results obtained for risk preferences. Using risk
data from this same data set, L’Haridon and Vieider (2016) reported considerably more heterogeneity
between individuals than between countries, with the country-level variance quantified at between 7%
and 33% depending on the model parameter. Using a hypothetical question obtained from representative
samples from 76 countries and 80,000 respondents, Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huﬀman and Sunde
(2015) found the country level variance to be 9%. Using a diﬀerent survey question in a sample of over
100,000 repondents from 78 countries, Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) found this figure to be 10%.
9It seems desirable to obtain a measure of between-country variation that is independent of the level
of variance at the residual level. A very simple measure consists in pairwise between-country comparisons
of average ambiguity premia aggregated per subject for gains and losses. Of all possible comparisons,
88% are significant for gains and 89% for losses (at the 5% level, without adjustment for multiple testing).
The corresponding result is somewhat lower for risk, coming in at 72% for gains and 75% for losses. This
shows that there is indeed substantial between-country variation of ambiguity attitudes.
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Table 4: Country level regressions
gains (ambiguity aversion) losses (ambiguity seeking)
benchmark model I model II model III benchmark model I model II model III
log GDP p.c. 0.010** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
prob.*GDP 0.057*** 0.042**
(0.014) (0.019)
Gini coeﬀ. 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.008** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
private university 0.019 0.011 0.011 -0.019* -0.014 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
democracy 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
British legal origins -0.021* -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Socialist legal origins -0.006 0.007 0.007 -0.030** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
German legal origins -0.022*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
OPEC dummy -0.057** -0.057** 0.025 0.025
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
pred. genetic div. -0.342*** -0.342*** 0.030 0.030
(0.111) (0.111) (0.127) (0.127)
pr. gen. div. sqrd 0.350*** 0.350*** -0.034 -0.034
(0.112) (0.112) (0.125) (0.125)
degrees latitude -0.001* -0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
probability | country r.s. X X
prospect controls X X X X X X X X
individual controls X X X X X X X X
constant 0.059*** -0.031 -0.127* -0.127* -0.034*** -0.062 -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.048) (0.065) (0.065) (0.005) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049)
country VAR (⇥1000) 0.401*** 0.0202*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.394*** 0.252*** 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.201) (0.102) (0.048) (0.048) (0.241) (0.148) (0.139) (0.139)
subject VAR 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
residual VAR 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 17629 17629 17629 17629 17605 17605 17605 17605
Subjects 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939
countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
log likelihood 1983.099 1989.931 1995.732 2099.960 1565.737 1570.417 1571.647 1648.301
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Country-level variance is shown multiplied by 1000 to be able to assess changes across regressions
World Bank data for 2010), as well as the Gini coeﬃcient to capture income inequality
(assembled from various sources—see appendix A), and a dummy capturing whether the
university where the experiment was run was private (which is likely to indicate students
that are well oﬀ relative to the rest of the country). The institutional data comprise
‘democracy’, a variable capturing the institutional and political stability over the last
decades, and legal origins dummies (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). The regression explains a marginally significant proportion of the variance for
gains ( 2(7) = 13.66, p = 0.058)10, but not for losses ( 2(7) = 9.36, p = 0.228). For gains,
10Given the highly significant correlations with especially GDP, it may appear odd that the improve-
ment in variance explained is only marginally significant. This is in part due to the penalty imposed
29
we find a significant eﬀect of GDP per capita, going in the direction of richer countries
being more ambiguity averse. We also find some eﬀects of legal origins, with subjects in
countries with UK legal origins and socialist legal origins showing less ambiguity aversion
than subjects in French legal origins countries. For losses, we find subjects from coun-
tries with more income inequality to be more ambiguity averse; we also find marginally
significant eﬀects of democracy (more institutionally stable countries are more ambiguity
averse). We also find more ambiguity aversion in private universities, and socialist legal
origins countries are more ambiguity averse for losses.
Model II further adds variables capturing genetic diversity and a geographical con-
trol. The former contain a measure of predicted genetic diversity developed by Ashraf
and Galor (2013), and its square. Similar measures were used by Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) to explain income diﬀerences deriving from trading behaviour. Becker, Dohmen,
Enke and Falk (2015) found correlations of such genetic measurements with risk prefer-
ences, explaining the correlations by a ‘serial founder eﬀect’. The geographical variable
consists of absolute distance from the equator (in degrees of latitude). For gains, these
variables further reinforce the eﬀect of GDP. Subjects in OPEC countries are found to
be less ambiguity averse than what their GDP would suggest. Genetic diversity shows
an inverse U-shape, whereby moderately diverse countries (typically in Europe) are the
least ambiguity averse (after controlling for the other variables, including GDP), and the
most diverse countries in Africa and least diverse ones in Latin America and East Asia
are the most ambiguity averse. This is interesting, because this parallels the relationship
between genetic diversity and GDP per capita pointed out by Ashraf and Galor (2013).
We are, however, unable to replicate these eﬀects for losses. Once again, the model sig-
for using up several degrees of freedom. Indeed, if we only add GDP per capita in the regression, the
proportion of variance explained is significant at conventional levels ( 2(1) = 5.29, p = 0.022).
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nificantly improves the fit over model I for gains ( 2(3) = 11.60, p = 0.021), but not for
losses ( 2(3) = 2.46, p = 0.652).
Finally, in model III we add the random slopes of the prospect characteristics to
account for diﬀerences across countries. In addition, we try to explain diﬀerence in
a-insensitivity across countries by adding an interaction with GDP per capita to the
fixed part of the model. This again significantly improves model fit—this time for both
gains ( 2(2) = 208.46, p < 0.001) and for losses ( 2(2) = 153.31, p < 0.001). The
eﬀects previously found remain generally stable. The interaction term (or ‘crossed eﬀect’)
between GDP per capita and probability furthermore shows that a-insensitivity is larger
in our subject pool for richer countries—an eﬀect that holds for both gains and losses.
We conclude this section by assessing the success of our modelling exercise. Overall,
our heaviest model III explains fully 85% of the between country variance for gains, and
a somewhat more modest 45% for losses. The results are thus qualitatively diﬀerent
from those seen at lower levels. Indeed, the proportion of variance explained is higher
even than for risk, albeit similar in the sense that aggregated preferences prove easier to
explain than preferences at the individual level. One explanation for this may be the lower
total variance to be explained. Another may lie in the sheer number of macroeconomic
characteristics to pick from. Ultimately, however, we believe that aggregating ambiguity
preferences at this level achieves something very important that could not be achieved at
lower levels—the emergence of stable trends from a sea of heterogeneity.
4 Discussion and conclusion
We found our measures of ambiguity aversion to reproduce typical aggregate trends ob-
served in previous experiments. Aggregating across diﬀerent prospects and across indi-
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viduals, we found ambiguity aversion to be the prevalent pattern for gains in all coun-
tries. For losses, we still found a prevalence of ambiguity aversion in the aggregate. This
ambiguity aversion was, however, much weaker than for gains, and for some countries am-
biguity neutrality could not be rejected (with one country being significantly ambiguity
seeking). We furthermore replicated patterns whereby ambiguity attitudes change less
than proportionally with the probability, known as a-insensitivity, in nearly all countries,
and for both gains and losses. We did, however, not find significant levels of ambiguity
seeking for either losses or small probabilities, as have been reported in most of the pre-
vious literature (see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015, for a review). This may be due
to the our measurement tasks, which are not directly comparative in nature, so that they
can be seen as a lower bound on ambiguity attitudes.
When it came to explaining the patterns found at the macroeconomic level, our re-
gressions proved quite successful. GDP per capita was significantly related to ambiguity
aversion, with poorer countries being significantly less ambiguity averse. This parallels
recent findings according to which poorer countries tend to be less risk averse than rich
ones (L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016; Vieider, Beyene, Bluﬀstone, Dissanayake, Gebreegzi-
abher, Martinsson and Mekonnen, 2016). We further found an inverse-U shaped eﬀect of
predicted genetic diversity. This eﬀect seems interesting in conjunction with a similarly-
shaped relationship between the same genetic diversity measure and GDP uncovered by
Ashraf and Galor (2013). Indeed, there may be wider implications considering the link
of genetic measures to trade (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009), and the complementary re-
lationship between unfamiliarity and trade (Huang, 2007). It seems, however, premature
to overemphasize this point based on one single dataset.
Once we move from the group level to the individual and premium level, our results
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change. Large amounts of heterogeneity are the preponderant finding at the individual
level. We succeed in explaining very little of the individual-level variance. Our attempts
show limited success not only in absolute terms, but even compared to similar exercises
carried out for risk preferences, which may themselves be considered to have had mixed
success. This conclusion is furthermore not unique to our data, since the few previous
studies investigating demographic correlates of ambiguity preferences do not seem to have
uncovered any regularities either (see the discussion of Trautmann and van de Kuilen,
2015, on this point). Any eﬀects of demographics we find at the individual level are
inconsistent between gains and losses, and tend to be economically weak.
The picture becomes even bleaker when moving from the subject level to the premium
level. Even after including all conceivable prospect characteristics and allowing those
characteristics to have individual-specific eﬀects, we manage to explain a meagre 19% of
the variance at that level for gains, and not much more than 10% for losses. For risk,
the result using similar models (which have not been optimised specifically to account
for risk preferences) is close to 75%. In other words, the amount of variance we manage
to explain at the premium level is particularly low when compared to similar exercises
for risk preferences. There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this—the data are
plagued by massive amounts of noise. These findings are consistent with those of Stahl
(2014), who also found high levels of noise in measures of ambiguity aversion.
Our results can shed some light on the many unsuccessful attempts at detecting
stable correlates of ambiguity preferences at the individual level. Borghans et al. (2009),
Binmore et al. (2012), and Sutter et al. (2013) all express some frustration in detecting
such correlates. Dimmock et al. (2015a) and Dimmock et al. (2015b) report better success
at predicting economic outcomes. While their main focus is on correlates of ambiguity
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attitudes, their results are more in agreement with ours than one might infer from the
tone of the papers. For instance, in the Dutch sample they find that a comprehensive set
of observable characteristics of respondents could account for between 2.2% and 5.4% of
the variance in the diﬀerent parameters. In the US population, individual characteristics
can explain 2.6% of the overall variance.11 Furthermore, for losses the authors could not
find any correlates of ambiguity attitudes except for risk aversion. Overall, our results
thus appear to be in line with the bulk of the previous literature when it comes to the
detection of correlates of ambiguity attitudes.
This leaves the question of whether these low correlations are due to noise in the data
or to heterogeneity that is orthogonal to observable characteristics. While we cannot
provide a definite answer to this question, we strongly suspect that noise plays an impor-
tant role. To see this, consider the correlation of ambiguity premia for (1/8 : 20; 0) and
(1/8 : 20; 5) and for (7/8 : 20; 0) and (7/8 : 20; 5). These two tasks are very similar, and
can thus be used to examine the test-retest reliability of our measures. The correlation
we find between the two is, however, very low at ⇢ = 0.24 and ⇢ = 0.53 respectively
(Spearman rank correlations; results for losses are similar and can be found in the online
appendix). Out-of-sample predictions based on parameters estimated from our model
perform even more poorly—see online appendix for details. According to classical mea-
surement theory (see e.g. Allen and Yen, 2001), this means that any correlation with
observable characteristics would be attenuated significantly due to measurement issues of
ambiguity attitudes. This in turn means that noise in measurement is almost certainly
a substantial part of the story when it comes to explaining the weak correlations with
observable characteristics we and others have observed.
Given the good results at the aggregate level, and given the much more stable trends
11We are grateful to Roy Kouwenberg for having provided this figure in private correspondence.
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uncovered for risk in this same data set (L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016), we think that the
high levels of noise are unlikely to result from particular measurement problems aﬀecting
only our experiment. Noise may, however, be exacerbated by the separate measurement
of valuations for risk and for uncertainty, from which ambiguity attitudes are then de-
rived. The CEs for risk and for uncertainty may be aﬀected by separate error terms,
which could increase the incidence of noise. An examination of violations of first order
stochastic dominance under risk and uncertainty, however, does not reveal any unusual
noisiness in our measurements (see online appendix for details). An interesting question
is nevertheless to what extent our particular measurement method may have influenced
the noise levels we find, and whether these noise levels are absent in tasks involving direct
comparisons between risky and uncertainty tasks, such as matching probabilities.
In particular, Dimmock et al. (2015b) report better success in explaining variations in
matching probabilities across the probability spectrum. The diﬀerence between the two
tasks may, however, be smaller than one might think. Binmore et al. (2012) draw similar
conclusions to ours, even though they use matching probabilities to measure ambiguity
attitudes. Dimmock et al. (2015b), using two choices as consistency checks, report that
fully 42% of such responses result in inconsistencies. We can compare these findings to
our own data by examining the consistency of choices between the premia used in the
analysis and premia for prospects with non-zero lower outcomes. Using all four such pairs,
we find violation rates between 24% and 28% (see online appendix for details). These
rates are indeed remarkably consistent with those reported by Dimmock et al. (2015b).
While only a direct methodological comparison can give conclusive evidence about the
relative merits of diﬀerent measurement tasks, our tentative conclusion from this evidence
is thus that the diﬀerence seems to be at best one of degree. For instance, Dimmock et al.
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(2015b) report that 43% of the within-subject variance can be explained by probability
variations. While this is certainly better than our 20%, it still falls far short of the 75%
we observe under risk.12 Ultimately, only direct comparative evidence will allow for a
clear conclusion on the relative merits of diﬀerent methods used to measure ambiguity
attitudes.
Our conclusions about measuring ambiguity attitudes are rather negative. We do
not want to say with this that ambiguity does not matter. The point is rather that
processes resembling ambiguity are quite artificial, and may thus have limited real world
applications. There furthermore appear to be severe measurement problems. Ambiguity
may well matter where it occurs naturally in the real wold—see for instance Kunreuther,
Meszaros, Hogarth and Spranca (1995) for evidence that the presence of ambiguity about
the precise probabilities underlying a process aﬀects the pricing decisions of insurance un-
derwriters. The way forward may then be to investigate naturally occurring uncertainty,
rather than artificial ambiguity that is rare in the real world. This will mean focusing
on natural sources of uncertainty, as some studies have already done (Abdellaoui et al.,
2011; Baillon, Bleichrodt, Keskin, l’Haridon and Li, 2016a). Baillon et al. (2016b) pro-
posed a method for the nonparametric measurement of ambiguity attitudes and showed
that it exhibits high levels of measurement reliability. This may also mean moving away
from a comparison point of risk, which can hardly ever be found in reality, and towards
varying degrees of ambiguity underlying outcome-generating processes. Time will tell
whether such approaches will indeed perform better in terms of the external validity of
experimentally measured preferences.
12The diﬀerence between our figure and theirs may further be over-estimated by the diﬀerent methods
we use to account for explained variance. For instance, Dimmock et al. use an ‘overall R2’ to account
for the explained variance. This captures changes in within- and between-subject variance, while our
measure only looks at one type of variance in isolation.
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A Characteristics country by country
Table A.1: Number of subjects per country and principal characteristics
country Sub.s For.s age male econ math natural hum arts social PPP/e language University GDP Gini
Australia 61 6 25.41 0.656 0.262 0.180 0.131 0.098 0.049 0.033 2 AUD English University of Adelaide 39,466 .305
Belgium 91 13 20.64 0.451 0.418 0.055 0.088 0.066 0.022 0.132 e1 French University of Liege 38,633 .280
Brazil 84 1 20.86 0.683 0.964 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 2 Real Portuguese Escola de Administraão, São Paolo 11,719 .547
Cambodia 80 0 20.74 0.375 0.000 0.212 0.237 0.125 0.175 0.175 1500 Riel Khmer University of Phnom Penh 2,373 .444
Chile 96 0 21.46 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.260 500 Pesos Spanish Universidad de Conception 17,125 .521
China 204 0 21.55 0.608 0.127 0.451 0.181 0.083 0.005 0.064 4 RMB Chinese Jiao Tong, Shanghai 8,442 .480
Colombia 128 0 21.21 0.500 0.062 0.797 0.047 0.031 0.023 0.008 1500 Pesos Spanish Universidad de Medellin 10,103 .560
Costa Rica 106 5 22.71 0.666 0.292 0.179 0.113 0.009 0.019 0.132 500 Colones Spanish Universidad de Costa Rica, San Jose 12,236 .503
Czech Rep. 99 2 22.38 0.606 0.485 0.111 0.051 0.121 0.030 0.091 20 Kronas Czech Charles University, Prague 25,949 .310
Ethiopia 140 1 21.14 0.657 0.593 0.107 0.079 0.021 0.000 0.093 6 Birr English Addis Ababa University 1,116 .300
France 93 8 21.30 0.527 0.430 0.054 0.022 0.043 0.032 0.032 e1 French University of Rennes 1 35,194 .327
Germany 130 32 26.52 0.515 0.115 0.400 0.108 0.115 0.008 0.023 e1 German Technical University, Berlin 39,414 .270
Guatemala 84 1 22.20 0.464 0.345 0.179 0.000 0.119 0.036 0.131 6 Quetzales Spanish Universidad Francisco Marroquín 4,961 .559
India 89 0 21.01 0.303 0.697 0.000 0.022 0.112 0.090 0.034 22 Rupees English University of Kolkata 3,650 .368
Japan 84 0 21.74 0.512 0.095 0.417 0.107 0.107 0.000 0.048 120 Yen Japanese Hiroshima Shudo University 34,278 .376
Kyrgyzstan 97 2 20.02 0.485 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.289 25 KGS Russian University of Bishkek 2,424 .362
Malaysia 64 0 20.09 0.578 0.578 0.188 0.062 0.000 0.016 0.047 2 Ringgit English University of Nottingham Malaysia 15,589 .462
Nicaragua 120 1 20.94 0.550 0.917 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 Córdobas Spanish Universidad National Autonoma 2,940 .405
Nigeria 202 2 22.65 0.495 0.406 0.000 0.005 0.054 0.312 0.119 110 Naira English University of Lagos 2,532 .437
Peru 95 1 23.66 0.463 0.579 0.368 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.042 2 N. Soles Spanish Instituto del Peru 10,318 .460
Poland 89 1 24.00 0.517 0.427 0.079 0.067 0.169 0.000 0.124 2.4 Zloty Polish University of Warsaw 21,281 .341
Russia 70 8 20.56 0.500 0.729 0.129 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.014 22 Rubles Russian Higher School of Economics 21,358 .420
Saudi Arabia 65 12 21.74 1.000 0.585 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 Riyal English King Fahd University 24,434 .570
South Africa 71 18 22.44 0.606 0.451 0.254 0.056 0.056 0.014 0.042 8 Rand English University of Cape Town 11,035 .650
Spain 80 3 20.94 0.513 0.450 0.037 0.000 0.100 0.037 0.225 e1 Spanish Universidad Pompeu Fabra 32,701 .320
Thailand 79 0 20.59 0.354 0.329 0.101 0.139 0.000 0.013 0.215 20 Baht Thai University of Khon Kaen 8,703 .536
Tunisia 74 0 22.26 0.527 0.230 0.473 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 Dinar French Université Libre de Tunis 9,415 .400
UK 80 0 20.77 0.450 0.700 0.000 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.075 1 Pound English King’s College London 36,511 .350
USA 97 22 21.32 0.495 0.144 0.206 0.113 0.041 0.031 0.186 $ 1 English University of Michigan Ann Arbor 48,442 .450
Vietnam 87 0 20.20 0.575 0.667 0.057 0.034 0.000 0.011 0.023 8000 Dong Vietnamese Ho-Chi-Minh-City University 3,435 .357
Total 2939 139 21.83 0.530 0.402 0.189 0.069 0.056 0.040 0.089
Sub.s stands for number of subjects, For.s for number of foreigners; econ etc. indicate study majors; PPP/eindicates exchange rates in purchasing power parity used for conversion
Gini coeﬃcients are taken from the World Bank where available, else from the CIA World Factbook; 2011 or closest available
GDP refers to 2011 values in PPP, current US Dollars; source: World Bank
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APPENDIX: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
Consistency checks and attenuation anaylsis
Consistency checks
In the main text, we only used stimuli with zero lower outcomes in order to keep our
analysis simple. We can, however, now use the four additional choice list pairs providing
non-zero lower outcomes to test for consistency of responses. In particular, the choice list
pairs with probabilities 1/8 and 7/8 were repeated with a lower outcome consisting of the
PPP-equivalent of e5 instead of 0. Notice how this mimics the repetition by Dimmock
et al. (2015b) of some choices with a probability of the known urn of plus or minus 10%.
Indeed, taking the 0 lower outcome away and replacing it with e5 reduces the ambigu-
ity of a choice, since the complementary probability is now assigned to a positive outcome
(and vice versa for losses). This in turn means that ambiguity aversion predicts that am-
biguity premia for the prospects with non-zero lower outcomes (i/8 : x; 5) with i = 1, 7
ought not to be larger than those for the matched list pairs with zero lower outcomes (in
absolute value) (i/8 : x; 0). Similarly, ambiguity seeking predicts that ambiguity premia
for the prospects with non-zero lower outcomes ought not to be lower than those for the
matched list pairs with zero lower outcomes. For losses, both predictions have opposite
signs.
Table 2 shows the number of choices incompatible with ambiguity aversion and am-
biguity seeking for each of the four possible comparisons between prospects. Table 2 also
shows the percentage of choices incompatible with either ambiguity aversion or ambiguity
seeking in the four additional choice lists. Our empirical data indicate moderate propor-
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tions of violations, around 24 to 28 %. Notice how the figures are similar to the violation
rates reported by Dimmock et al. (2015b), who reported that 42% of subjects responded
in an inconsistent manner (not counting indiﬀerences). This provides evidence that the
levels of nosie in the two data sets are indeed quite similar.
Gains, i = 1 Gains, i = 7 Losses, i = 1 Losses, i = 7
nbr. ambiguity aversion 432 623 439 372
nbr. ambiguity seeking 235 161 166 336
total percentage violations 23.75 27.91 21.57 25.23
Table 2: Consistency check: number and percentage of incompatible repeated choices
Out of sample predictions
We used the individual-level parameters generated from the multilevel regression model
described by Eq. (6) to generate out-of-sample predictions for the prospects (i/8 : x; 5)
with i = 1, 7. These predictions assume that utility is linear. With non-linear utilities,
utility of outcome y = 5 remains unkown and in-sample predictions of ambiguitiy premia
on prospects (i/8 : x; 0), i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 cannot be directly used to generated out-of-
sample predictions of ambiguity premia on (i/8 : x; 5), i = 1, 7.
Table 3 shows the Spearman correlation coeﬃcients for the comparisons between the
elicited ambiguity premia and the predicted premia on prospects (i/8 : x; 5), i = 1, 7 for
gains and losses.
Gains, i = 1 Gains, i = 7 Losses, i = 1 Losses, i = 7
correlation 0.229 0.466 0.109 0.096
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 2808 2810 2802 2803
Table 3: Descriptive statistics out-of-sample predictions,
The low level of correlation between the measured ambiguity premia and the predicted
ambiguity premia found in out-of-sample predictions is confirmed by the Spearman cor-
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relations between the measurements on prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (i/8 : x; 5), i = 1, 7.
Table 4 shows these correlations for ambiguity premia. For the sake of comparison Table
4 also shows the correlations for the certainty equivalents under risk and under uncer-
tainty. Table 4 shows that correlations between measurements on prospects (i/8 : x; 0)
and (i/8 : x; 5), i = 1, 7 were not only low in absolute terms, but also much lower for
ambiguity premia than for certainty equivalents unde risk and uncertainty.
Gains, i = 1 Gains, i = 7 Losses, i = 1 Losses, i = 7
ambiguity premia 0.239 0.535 0.398 0.350
certainty equivalents, risk 0.439 0.694 0.592 0.660
certainty equivalents, uncertainty 0.441 0.686 0.633 0.720
Table 4: correlations between measurements on prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (i/8 : x; 5), i = 1, 7.
Relations of dominance between prospects
In this section we provide evidence on the violations of first-order stochastic dominance
between prospects. Two type of relations of dominance can be investigated with our data.
First, we can compare the certainty equivalents for prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (j/8 : x; 0),
where i and j denote the number of balls associate with the highest outcome in absolute
value. For gain prospects, the relation of dominance implies:
i > j , ceri+   cerj+ and ceui+   ceuj+
and similarly, for losses:
i < j , ceri    cerj  and ceui    ceuj 
Second, we can compare the certainty equivalents for prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (i/8 :
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x; 5), with i = 1, 7. For gains, the relation of dominance implies that the certainty
equivalent for (i/8 : x; 5) is larger or equal the certainty equivalent for (i/8 : x; 0). For
losses, the relation of dominance implies the opposite.
Relations of dominance between prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (j/8 : x; 0)
Our data contains 6 rank-ordered prospects in terms of likelihoods i/8 (i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7).
This implies 15 possible comparisons in terms of first order stochatic dominance. For each
subject and for each of these possible violations violations, we evaluated the violations of
first-order stochastic dominance for gains and losses, under risk and uncertainty.
Table 5 shows the average percentages of violations of first-order stochastic domi-
nance for gains and losses under risk. Numbers below the diagonal correspond to the
percentage of violations in the gain domain. Numbers above the diagonal correspond to
the percentage of violations in the loss domain.
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 5 j = 6 j = 7
i = 1 14.25 11.65 8.35 7.29 6.20
i = 2 20.65 13.19 7.87 6.54 6.17
i = 3 16.37 13.85 8.45 6.64 6.61
i = 5 7.66 6.77 7.25 11.55 8.14
i = 6 6.60 5.89 6.60 11.50 10.18
i = 7 6.06 5.85 5.96 7.42 9.19
Table 5: Average percentage violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance under risk
Table 6 shows the average percentages of violations of first-order stochastic dominance
for gains and losses under uncertainty. Numbers below the diagonal correspond to the
percentage of violations in the gain domain. Numbers above the diagonal correspond to
the percentage of violations in the loss domain.
Comparison of Tables 5 and 6 shows that percentage of violations were comparable
across sources of uncertainty and signs (gains vs. losses). We ran a two-way repeated-
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j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 5 j = 6 j = 7
i = 1 18.20 13.90 9.03 7.67 6.24
i = 2 17.93 15.20 8.22 7.60 5.73
i = 3 13.44 13.47 8.93 7.43 6.24
i = 5 8.00 8.55 8.89 12.44 8.63
i = 6 7.11 7.45 8.03 12.19 10.84
i = 7 5.89 6.02 6.47 9.64 11.20
Table 6: Average percentage violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance under uncertainty
measure ANOVA, with sign (gains vs. losses) as the first factor and source of uncertainty
as the second factor, on the percentage of first-order stochastic dominance violations.
The value of the intercept is 8.9 % (p-value: 0). We found no evidence for a sign eﬀect
(coeﬃcient on gain dummy: 0.003, p-value: 0.392). We found a significant source eﬀect,
but with a rather small coeﬃcient for the uncertainty dummy (coeﬃcient equal to 0.009,
p-value: 0.002). Therefore, uncertainty raised modestly the percentage of first-order
stochastic dominance violations by 0.9%. We found no interaction between source and
sign (p-value: 0.283).
Last, we show evidence for violations of first-order stochastic dominance at the indi-
vidual level. Figure 5 shows the four possible comparisons at the subject level.
Relations of dominance between prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (i/8 : x; 5)
Our data contains 8 pairs of rank-ordered prospects in terms of outcomes: two in the
gain domain with i = 1, 7 under risk and under uncertainty, two in the loss domain
under risk and under uncertainty. Table 7 shows the average percentages of violations
of first-order stochastic dominance for gains and losses under risk. Numbers below the
diagonal correspond to the percentage of violations in the gain domain. Numbers above
the diagonal correspond to the percentage of violations in the loss domain.
Table 8 shows the average percentages of violations of first-order stochastic domi-
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Figure 5: Individual violations of first-order stochastic dominance on prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (j/8 :
x; 0), i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7
nance for gains and losses under risk. Numbers below the diagonal correspond to the
percentage of violations in the gain domain. Numbers above the diagonal correspond to
the percentage of violations in the loss domain.
Comparison of Tables 7 and 8 shows that percentage of violations were comparable
across sources of uncertainty and signs (gains vs. losses). We ran a two-way repeated-
measure ANOVA, with sign (gains vs. losses) as the first factor and source of uncertainty
as the second factor, on the percentage of dominance relations. The value of the intercept
is 19.9 % (p-value: 0). We found evidence for a sign eﬀect (coeﬃcient on gain dummy:-
0.064, p-value: <0.001). We also found a significant source eﬀect, with smaller coeﬃcient
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y = 0, i = 1 y = 5, i = 1 y = 0, i = 7 y = 5, i = 7
y = 0, i = 1 7.52
y = 5, i = 1 32.24
y = 0, i = 7 8.97
y = 5, i = 7 17.93
Table 7: Average percentage violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance under risk, assuming linear
utility
y = 0, i = 1 y = 5, i = 1 y = 0, i = 2 y = 5, i = 2
y = 0, i = 1 8.69
y = 5, i = 1 26.30
y = 0, i = 2 6.37
y = 5, i = 2 12.03
Table 8: Average percentage violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance under uncertainty, assum-
ing linear utility
(coeﬃcient for the uncertainty dummy equals to -0.024, p-value: -0.001). Therefore,
both losses and risk raised the percentage of first-order stochastic dominance violations
by 2.4%. We also found interaction between source and sign to be significant (p-value:
0.025). Figure 6 shows the comparisons of violations of first-order stochastic dominance
at the individual level.
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Figure 6: Individual violations of first-order stochastic dominance on prospects (i/8 : x; 0) and (i/8 :
x; 5), i = 1, 7
Distrust of the experimenter: Pilot results
Methods and setup
We recruited 89 subjects at the Technical University Berlin, Germany, where also the
main experiment was run. Of these, we randomly allocated 41 to a baseline which closely
imitated the original experimental design. The remaining 48 were allocated to a treatment
meant to test whether trust in the experimenter influenced the findings.
In general, we followed the procedures of the main experiment closely. The experiment
was conducted using paper and pencil. Decision tasks with nonzero lower outcomes
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and probabilities diﬀerent from 0.5 were dropped from the task, in order to make the
experiment somewhat shorter; and subjects were not forbidden to switch to and fro
between the prospect and the sure amount. This serves to make the data comparable with
the evidence collected, while at the same time abandoning some or the more restrictive
assumptions.
In the baseline experiment, fixed numbers were assigned to the balls in the uncertain
urn, equivalent to those of the risky urn. The treatment consisted in giving subjects a
choice what balls (numbers) to bet on. Instead of assigning fixed numbers to the winning
and losing balls, subjects were told that they would have to choose the numbers on which
they wanted to bet. Only blank balls were displayed in the decision problems, so that
subjects could write their own numbers on the balls. This procedure thus emulates the
common precaution in 50-50 Ellsberg problems whereby subjects are allowed to choose
the colour they want to bet on. See also Abdellaoui et al. (2011) for an analogous
implementation using eight coloured balls.
The null hypotheses is that it makes no diﬀerence whether subjects are allowed to
choose the numbers to bet on or whether these numbers are pre-assigned, i.e. that mis-
trust of the experimenter plays no significant role for ambiguity attitudes. The alternative
hypothesis is that we will find more ambiguity aversion when the numbers of the winning
balls are preassigned. These hypotheses can be further refined according to the winning
probabilities and the decision domains.
Results
Figure 7 shows the nonparametric ambiguity premia separately for each prospect pair.
Figure 7(a) shows the results for gains, juxtaposing the baseline and treatment conditions.
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It can easily be seen that no significant diﬀerences arise between the treatments. This
result holds either with a parametric t-test, or with a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test.
We observe a similar result for losses, shown in figure 7(b). The equality of ambiguity pre-
mia observed is indeed very clear for probabilities p   0.25. While for the smallest proba-
bility it would appear that subjects are more ambiguity averse in the baseline treatment,
this is not significant at conventional levels either using a t-test (t(87) = 1.60, p = 0.112),
or using a Mann-Whitney test (z = 1.65, p = 0.099). We thus conclude that mistrust
towards the experimenter does not play a major role for our results.
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Figure 7: Diﬀerences by treatment
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Instructions
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Instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment in decision making! You will obtained 4 Euros for 
having come to the experiment—those 4 Euros are yours to keep independently of the outcomes in 
the experiment. In addition, you will be compensated with whatever you earn during the experiment 
according to the procedures described in the instructions.
The instructions will be read to you in a short while. You may consult these instructions at any time 
during the experiment. In case you should have any questions or doubts, please raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come and assist you in private.
Please consider each decision carefully. Take a careful look at outcomes and the probabilities 
associated to them before taking a decision. Remember that your final payoffs from this experiment 
will depend on the decisions you make (and of course, on chance).
Please remain seated when you are finished with the tasks. This experiment consists of two parts. 
Once everybody has finished the tasks in part I, new instructions will be read to you for part II. At 
the very end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire. The answer to the 
questionnaire as well as all your answers to the tasks will be private, and cannot be traced back to 
you personally. Once you are done filling in the questionnaire, an experimenter will call you up. 
Your payoff will then be determined in private, you will be given the money you won, after which 
you can leave.
Do not talk during the experiment, or you will be immediately excluded from the experiment !
Good luck!
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PART I
Choice tasks
In the present experiment, you will be asked to choose repeatedly between a fixed amount of money 
and a lottery. The lottery will always give you a chance to win one of two amounts of money. Figure 
1 shows a typical choice task. You are asked repeatedly to choose between playing the lottery and 
obtaining a sure amount of money. For each row, you are asked to indicate whether you would 
prefer to play the lottery or to obtain the sure amount of money by ticking the preferred option.
The urn indicated in the figure contains eight numbered balls. One ball will be extracted from the 
urn to determine your payoffs in case you should play the lottery. In the lottery displayed, if ball 1 , 
2 , 3, or 4 is extracted, you obtain €10; if ball 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 is extracted, you obtain nothing. Please 
pay close attention to the amounts to be won as well as the number of balls associated with each 
outcome, since they change across decisions.
Fig. 1: Example of a typical decision task
 
Lottery Sure 
amount
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
We are interested in the amount for which you will switch from preferring the lottery to preferring 
the sure amount. Most likely, you will begin by choosing the lottery for small sure amounts, and at a 
certain point switch to the sure amount as the latter increases. If you do not want the lottery at all, 
you can choose to get the sure amount in the first row and then continue with the sure amount for all 
choices (if you prefer €0.50 over the lottery you should also prefer €1.00 over the lottery, etc.). 
Where you will switch from the lottery to the sure amount depends entirely on your preferences—
there are no right or wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several 
times between lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or 
if it is not possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example, if you have not ticked any box 
for a given row or ticked both boxes for a given row).
1
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7
8
1 3 4
5 6 7 8
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Types of choices
You will be asked to take 18 decisions, for each one of which you will need to decide between a 
lottery and a series of sure amounts as exemplified in figure 1 above. Please pay close attention to 
the amounts to be won as well as the number of balls associated with each outcome! Indeed, 
both the higher and lower amount, as well as the number of balls, change between decision 
problems. Since your final payoff depends on these decisions, it is crucial for you to pay close 
attention to these features.
There are two different types of lotteries involved. Figure 2 below shows the two different types 
of lotteries that you will encounter. Fig 2a shows the urn already familiar from figure 1 above. It 
contains exactly eight (8) balls, numbered from 1 to 8.
In Urn in Fig. 2b also contains exactly eight (8) balls. However, you cannot see what numbers the 
balls contained in the urn have. This means that you do not know the exact numbers that are 
present in that urn. All balls bear a number between 1 and 8 inclusive (have either 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 
6 , 7 , or 8 written on them), but it is possible that some numbers are absent from this urn while 
others occur repeatedly. Thus you do not know the exact composition of the urn.
Fig. 2a: transparent urn Fig. 2b: opaque urn
Payoff determination
After you have taken all the decisions, one of your decisions will be randomly drawn for real pay, 
i.e. the amounts indicated in the decision problem will be paid out for real. First, either part I or 
part II will be selected for real play by a coin flip. If part I is selected, then one of the 18 decision 
tasks is drawn at random, using a chance device with equal probability for each decision task to be 
extracted. For the extracted decision task, one of your decisions, corresponding to one row for 
which you had to indicate your preference between the sure amount and the lottery, will then be 
drawn at random with equal probability for each row. If for the row that is drawn you have 
indicated that you prefer the sure amount of money, you will simply be paid that amount.
In case you have chosen the lottery for the randomly determined row, then that lottery will be 
played according to the probabilities indicated. For the transparent urn, this will involve drawing a 
ball from an urn in which all numbers from 1 to 8 inclusive are present. If you should desire to do 
so, you can verify that there are indeed all balls from 1 to 8 in the urn. You will then be paid the 
outcome corresponding to the ball you drew. 
For the opaque urn, the procedure is exactly analogous, except that you will now draw a ball from a 
pre-composed urn, the exact composition of which you do not know. You will also be paid the 
outcome corresponding to the ball you drew. If you should desire to do so, after the draw you can 
verify that there are indeed 8 balls with numbers between 1 and 8 inclusive in the urn.
1
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8
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Decision 1
Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 4.50 for sure
 
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted:
1
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Decision 2
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
1
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Decision 3
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 4
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O € 20.00 for sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure
O O € 24.50 for sure
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Decision 5
      Lottery Sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 17.00 for sure
 O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
Win € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O € 20.00 for sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure
O O € 24.50 for sure
O O € 25.00 for sure
O O € 25.50 for sure
O O € 26.00 for sure
O O € 26.50 for sure
O O € 27.00 for sure
O O € 27.50 for sure
O O € 28.00 for sure
O O € 28.50 for sure
O O € 29.00 for sure
O O € 29.50 for sure
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Decision 6
      Lottery Sure
O O € 20.50 for sure
O O € 21.00 for sure
O O € 21.50 for sure
O O € 22.00 for sure
O O € 22.50 for sure
O O € 23.00 for sure
O O € 23.50 for sure
O O € 24.00 for sure
O O € 24.50 for sure
O O € 25.00 for sure
O O € 25.50 for sure
O O € 26.00 for sure
O O € 26.50 for sure
Win € 30 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 27.00 for sure
 O O € 27.50 for sure
O O € 28.00 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 28.50 for sure
O O € 29.00 for sure
O O € 29.50 for sure
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Decision 7
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 8
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 9
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 10
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 11
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 12
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 13
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 14
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 15
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 16
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O
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Decision 17
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 18
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 19
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 20
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 21
      Lottery Sure
O O € 0.50 for sure
O O € 1.00 for sure
O O € 1.50 for sure
O O € 2.00 for sure
O O € 2.50 for sure
O O € 3.00 for sure
O O € 3.50 for sure
O O € 4.00 for sure
O O € 4.50 for sure
O O € 5.00 for sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 7.00 for sure
 O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
Win € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
O O € 12.00 for sure
O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
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Decision 22
      Lottery Sure
O O € 5.50 for sure
O O € 6.00 for sure
O O € 6.50 for sure
O O € 7.00 for sure
O O € 7.50 for sure
O O € 8.00 for sure
O O € 8.50 for sure
O O € 9.00 for sure
O O € 9.50 for sure
O O € 10.00 for sure
O O € 10.50 for sure
O O € 11.00 for sure
O O € 11.50 for sure
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 12.00 for sure
 O O € 12.50 for sure
O O € 13.00 for sure
Win € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O € 13.50 for sure
O O € 14.00 for sure
O O € 14.50 for sure
O O € 15.00 for sure
O O € 15.50 for sure
O O € 16.00 for sure
O O € 16.50 for sure
O O € 17.00 for sure
O O € 17.50 for sure
O O € 18.00 for sure
O O € 18.50 for sure
O O € 19.00 for sure
O O € 19.50 for sure
O O
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PART II
If part II should be chosen for real play, you are endowed with €20. These €20 are yours, but it is 
possible that you will lose part or all of the money in the experiment (but no more than that).
In part II you are again asked to repeatedly choose between the two types of lotteries you have 
already encountered in part I of the experiment and a series of sure amounts. However, the main 
difference now is that the amounts involved are negative instead of positive. Figure 4 shows an 
example of such a choice.
Fig. 4: example of a typical decision task from part II
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
In the example displayed, you face the following lottery: if a ball with the number 1 , 2 , 3, or 4 is 
extracted, you lose €10. If a ball with the number 5 , 6 , 7 , or 8 is extracted, you lose nothing. 
Please choose again for each row whether you would rather give up (i.e., pay) the sure amount 
indicated to the right or play the lottery.
Notice that, most likely, you will now begin to the right by choosing to give up the sure amounts 
as long as this implies giving up small amounts, and then switch to the lottery at a certain point. If  
you do not want to give up sure amounts at all, then in the first row you can choose the lottery and 
then continue with the lottery for all choices (if you are not willing to pay €0.50 to avoid playing the 
lottery, then you should not be willing to pay €1.00 to avoid it). Once again, when exactly you 
switch from the sure loss to the lottery depends entirely on your preferences—there are no right or 
wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between lottery 
and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not possible to 
clearly recognize your preference (for example because you have not ticked any box for a given row 
or ticked both boxes for a row).
In addition to the pure loss choices described above, you will also face some choices in which both 
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negative and positive amounts are involved. Also, what changes is now not the sure amount to the 
right, which is always equal to zero, but rather the amount you can lose in the lottery. Figure 3 
shows an example of this kind of choice problem.
Fig. 3: decision task where lottery amount changes
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted:
 
If one of the following balls is extracted, then:
Lose € 20 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 19 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 18 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 17 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 16 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 15 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 14 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 13 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 12 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 11 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 10 O O € 0 for sure
What is required of you in this task is exactly the same as for the other tasks. For each row, you 
should choose whether you prefer the sure amount to the right (which is now always zero), or the 
lottery to the left. Pay attention however: what changes is now the amount that can be lost in the 
lottery. Most likely, you would thus start from the right and choose zero for high losses, and then 
switch to the left as the losses in the lottery get smaller. You can however also start with the lottery 
and continue with it if that is your preference (if you prefer a lottery in which you can win €20 or 
lose €20 to zero, then you should also prefer the lottery when you can lose only €19). When you 
switch from the zero sure amount to the lottery depends only on your preferences—there is no right 
or wrong answer. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between 
lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not 
possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example because you have not ticked any box for 
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a given row or ticked both boxes for a row).
Payoff determination
In case part II should be chosen for real play, your payoff from part II will be determined in a way 
analogous to the payoff determination in the first part. First, one of the decision tasks will be chosen 
at random, and then one of the rows for which you had to indicate a choice. In each case, every 
choice task or row has an equal probability of being selected. According to your choice, you are 
will then have to pay the sure amount, or the lottery will be played out by drawing a ball from the 
indicated urn.
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Decision II-1
Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 4.50 for sure
 
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted:
8
42 31
8765
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
84
Decision II-2
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
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Decision II-3
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
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Decision II-4
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4
5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-5
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 17.00 for sure
 O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
Lose € 10 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4
5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-6
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3
4
5
6
7
2
8
1
3 4 5 6 7 82
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Decision II-7
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3
4
5
6
7
2
8
1
3 4 5 6 7 82
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Decision II-8
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
3 4 5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-9
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3
4 5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-10
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4 5
6 7 8
2
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Decision II-11
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4 5 6
7 8
2
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Decision II-12
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4 5 6 7
8
2
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Decision II-13
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 4 5 6 72
8
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Decision II-14
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3 4 5 6 7 82
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Decision II-15
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3 4 5 6 7 82
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Decision II-16
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1
3 4 5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-17
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3
4 5 6 7 8
2
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Decision II-18
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3 4 5
6 7 8
2
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Decision II-19
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3 4 5 6
7 8
2
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Decision II-20
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 0.50 for sure
O O – € 1.00 for sure
O O – € 1.50 for sure
O O – € 2.00 for sure
O O – € 2.50 for sure
O O – € 3.00 for sure
O O – € 3.50 for sure
O O – € 4.00 for sure
O O – € 4.50 for sure
O O – € 5.00 for sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 7.00 for sure
 O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
Lose € 0 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
O O – € 12.00 for sure
O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3 4 5 6 7
8
2
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Decision II-21
      Lottery Sure
O O – € 5.50 for sure
O O – € 6.00 for sure
O O – € 6.50 for sure
O O – € 7.00 for sure
O O – € 7.50 for sure
O O – € 8.00 for sure
O O – € 8.50 for sure
O O – € 9.00 for sure
O O – € 9.50 for sure
O O – € 10.00 for sure
O O – € 10.50 for sure
O O – € 11.00 for sure
O O – € 11.50 for sure
Lose € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 12.00 for sure
 O O – € 12.50 for sure
O O – € 13.00 for sure
Lose € 5 if one of the following balls is extracted: O O – € 13.50 for sure
O O – € 14.00 for sure
O O – € 14.50 for sure
O O – € 15.00 for sure
O O – € 15.50 for sure
O O – € 16.00 for sure
O O – € 16.50 for sure
O O – € 17.00 for sure
O O – € 17.50 for sure
O O – € 18.00 for sure
O O – € 18.50 for sure
O O – € 19.00 for sure
O O – € 19.50 for sure
1 3 4 5 6 72
8
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Decision II-22
Win € 20 if one of the following balls is extracted:
 
If one of the following balls is extracted, then:
Lottery Sure
Lose € 20 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 19 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 18 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 17 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 16 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 15 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 14 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 13 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 12 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 11 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 10 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 9 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 8 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 7 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 6 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 5 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 4 O O € 0 for sure
Lose € 3 O O € 0 for sure
1 3 4
5 6 7 8
2
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
8
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Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions about yourself. All answers are confidential and cannot be traced back to you  
personally.
Age: ___________            Study semester:____________
 O  female                O male 
What is your studies major?
O economics or business
O mathematics or engineering
O natural sciences
O medicine
O social sciences
O humanities
O arts
O other
Please indicate your grade point average: __________
Are you originally from $$name of country where exp. is to take place$$?          O yes        O no
If not, which country are you from originally? __________________
Are both your parents from $$name of country where exp. is to take place$$?     O yes        O no
Have you ever lived abroad for a significant period of time?
O never
O less than six months
O between six months and a year
O between one and two years
O between two and five years
O longer than five years
Could you give a rough indication of your monthly living expenses? _________
Could you give a rough indication of your monthly stipend?     ___________
Please indicate how many older siblings you have:_____________
Please indicate how many younger siblings you have:______________
Are you married?       O yes        O no
How tall are you? ___________cm
Please consider the following statement: “Man-induced climate change is a serious danger that could threaten our way 
of life”. Please indicate on the scale below the extent to which you agree with this statement, with 1 indicating “I don't  
agree at all” and 7 indicating “I fully agree”:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
O O O O O O O
Please consider the following statement: “It is imperative to take immediate action to limit potential catastrophic 
consequences from changes in global climate, even if such action may be costly”. Please indicate on the scale below the  
extent to which you agree with this statement, with 1 indicating “I don't agree at all” and 7 indicating “I fully agree”:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
O O O O O O O
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The following section seeks to evaluate your cultural orientation. Please indicate your agreement with each of the 
following statements:
Stongly 
disagree Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree Agree
Strongly 
agree
1. Individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group that they belong to O O O O O
2. Individuals should stick with the group even through difficulties O O O O O
3. Group welfare is more important than individual rewards O O O O O
4. Group success is more important than individual success O O O O O
5. Individuals should pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group O O O O O
6. Group loyalty should be encouraged even if individual goals suffer O O O O O
7. People in higher positions should make most decisions without consulting people 
in lower positions
O O O O O
8. People in higher positions should not delegate important tasks to people in lower 
positions
O O O O O
9. People in higher positions should not ask the opinions of people in lower 
positions too frequently
O O O O O
10. People ion higher positions should avoid social interaction with people in lower 
positions
O O O O O
11. People in lower positions should not disagree with decisions made by people in 
higher positions
O O O O O
12. It is important to have instructions spelled out in detail so that I always know 
what I am expected to do
O O O O O
13. It is important to closely follow instructions and procedures O O O O O
14. Rules/regulations are important because they inform me of what is expected of 
me
O O O O O
15. Standardized work procedures are helpful O O O O O
16. Instructions for operations are important O O O O O
17. It is more important for men to have a professional career than it is for women O O O O O
18. Men usually solve problems with logical analysis; women usually solve 
problems with intuition
O O O O O
19. Solving difficult problems usually requires an active forcible approach, which is 
typical for men
O O O O O
20. There are some jobs that a man can always do better than a woman O O O O O
21. Even though certain food products are available in a number of different flavors, 
I tend to buy the same flavor
O O O O O
22. I would rather stick with a brand I usually buy than try something I am not very 
sure of
O O O O O
23. I think of myself as a brand-loyal consumer O O O O O
24. When I go to a restaurant, I feel it is safer to order dishes I am familiar with O O O O O
25. If I like a brand, I rarely switch from it just to try something different O O O O O
26. I am very cautious in trying new or different products O O O O O
27. I rarely buy brands about which I am uncertain how they will perform O O O O O
28. I usually eat the same kinds of foods on a regular basis O O O O O
How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks? Please tick a box on the scale below, where 0 means “risk averse” and 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”:
Risk averse
Fully 
prepared to 
take risks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
O O O O O O O O O O O
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People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas?
How is it …   fully prepared
                                     risk averse                  to take risks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
– while driving? O O O O O O O O O O O
– in financial matters? O O O O O O O O O O O
– during leisure and sport? O O O O O O O O O O O
– in your occupation? O O O O O O O O O O O
– with your health? O O O O O O O O O O O
– your faith in other people? O O O O O O O O O O O
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won 100,000 Euros in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you receive 
the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows:
There is the chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount 
invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your 
lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
O   100.000 Euros
O    80.000 Euros
O  60.000 Euros
O  40.000 Euros
O  20.000 Euros
O  Nothing, I would decline the offer
How many inhabitants has the town where you lived at the age of 16?
____________________inhabitants
What are your religious views?
O atheist/agnostic
O catholic
O protestant
O muslim
O jewish
O hinduist
O buddist
O other:  ________________
Thank you for taking part in this experiment! Please remain seated until an experimenter 
calls you up.
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